What Thucydides Really Thought About Technology and War: An In-Depth Analysis
By Bret C. Devereaux, January 8, 2026
Thucydides, often hailed as one of the founders of historical inquiry, is renowned for his account of the Peloponnesian War—a conflict that reshaped the Ancient Greek world. Yet, despite his detailed chronicling of war and politics, what did Thucydides truly think about the role of technology in warfare? This question lies at the heart of a recent exclusive interview with Bret C. Devereaux, an ancient military historian and Teaching Assistant Professor at North Carolina State University, featured in the Cogs of War series.
Technology as Background, Not Driving Force
At first glance, Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War appears to document a critical phase of military change. Traditional military history often depicts the war as marking the end of a static Greek warfare system dominated by hoplite heavy infantry clashing in set-piece battles, with limited tactical variation or technological innovation. This older warfare model, dated back to the 700s and 600s BCE, is thought to have gradually given way during the Peloponnesian War to more complex strategies and technologies, eventually blossoming into the sophisticated warfare of the fourth century BCE—featuring catapults, gigantic warships, and combined arms.
However, this interpretation is subject to scholarly debate. Leading military historians like Peter Krentz, Hans van Wees, Fernando Echeverría, and Roel Konijnendijk argue that hoplite warfare was not a fixed tradition solidified centuries prior but rather an evolving martial practice that developed gradually from the eighth century through the Persian Wars—and only fully stabilized around the early 400s BCE. According to this view, many apparent tactical innovations documented by Thucydides actually reflect earlier Greek military elements that persisted throughout the period. The “old style” of hoplite warfare, rather than being an entrenched constant, was itself a relatively modern and fragile system during Thucydides’ life.
Thus, the war chronicled by Thucydides should be understood as a moment of gradual acceleration rather than sudden revolution in warfare—one that presaged deeper military transformations that would flourish after his death.
The Human Element Over Technological Novelty
Thucydides recognized his era as fundamentally transformative, but his emphasis was not on emerging technology per se. He repeatedly described the Peloponnesian War as “the greatest shift for the Greeks and some part of the barbarians,” underscoring its unprecedented scale and ferocity, but his focus rested more on the scale of conflict, political dynamics, and human behavior rather than on technological innovation.
While his Archaeology section recounts the initial emergence of technologies like navies and walled cities, these were already ancient by his time—well-established legacies rather than new phenomena. Notably, Thucydides mistakenly attributed the invention of Greek trireme warships to a period shortly before the Persian Wars, about sixty years before the Peloponnesian War began. This suggests a limited sensitivity to technical developments in land warfare, especially hoplite phalanx tactics, which dominate his narrative without detailed technological analysis.
The actual weaponry and military hardware remained largely stable throughout the fifth century BCE, with few exceptions. Unique instances, such as the use of large bellows to set fire at the Athenian fort of Delium or Syracuse’s reinforcement of warship bows, appear isolated rather than starting points for sweeping change. These innovations did not decisively shape the outcomes of key battles, like the decisive Syracusan naval victory.
Instead, Thucydides documented a transformation in the human dimension of warfare: the gradual erosion of traditional limits on conflict, increased siege warfare, larger, better-funded armies, and escalating brutality—including devastating raids and destruction of entire cities. These developments reveal a world—and a writer—grappling with the changed nature of war itself, not because of new machines, but because of altered human choices and calculations.
Siege Warfare: Sophistication Still Limited
Thucydides offers unusually detailed accounts of sieges and fortifications for his era, highlighting them as crucial features of the Peloponnesian conflict. Yet, in technological terms, Greek siegecraft lagged behind the Near East by centuries. While Assyrian armies had employed covered battering rams, siege towers, and advanced field engineering more than 250 years before the war, Greek forces mainly relied on constructing walls to surround and isolate enemy cities—a technique known as circumvallation.
These Greek siege techniques were primitive, often failing to achieve decisive breakthroughs. Early in the war, Spartan attempts to seize smaller fortified positions faltered. But as the war dragged on, Greek city-states invested increasing resources and time into prolonged sieges, exemplified by the two-year siege of Plataea and the infamous Athenian expedition against Syracuse. Although Greek siege warfare grew more frequent and intense during the conflict, the technological innovations that would later make sieges more effective only emerged in the subsequent century.
War Materiel as Symbols of Human Will
Interestingly, Thucydides often treats objects of war—like triremes, city walls, and siegeworks—not simply as tools or machines but as embodiments of human emotion, morale, and resolve. The siege of Plataea, with its shifting lines of circumvallation and counter-walls, tells as much about human tenacity and the wills of besiegers and defenders as it does about physical machines.
This perspective aligns with the broader tenor of Thucydides’ history, which emphasizes the psychological and political over the purely technological. Even when his narrative lingers on weapons and fortifications, these remain subservient to the drama of human choices, failures, ambitions, and fears.
Conclusion
In summary, Thucydides saw technology during the Peloponnesian War not as a revolutionary driver but as a backdrop to political and moral struggles. The real story was the transformation in the human conduct of war—the scale, the methods, and the ruthlessness—that defined his age. Technical innovations were rare and limited, while the strategic and emotional dimensions of conflict took center stage. For modern strategists and historians, this offers a vital reminder: amid great technical change, understanding the human element remains paramount.
Bret C. Devereaux is Teaching Assistant Professor in the Department of World Languages and Cultures at North Carolina State University specializing in ancient military history.
