Chinese Technology Underpins Iran’s Internet Control, Report Finds
London, 9 February 2026 — Iran’s sophisticated internet censorship and surveillance architecture is built largely on imported Chinese technologies, according to a new report released by British human rights organization Article 19. The findings highlight how Beijing’s digital tools—some originally developed for controlling its own population—have been adapted by Tehran to strengthen its grip on online information, especially in the wake of recent violent anti-government protests.
Advanced Surveillance Tech with Roots in China
The report reveals that Iran’s fine-tuned censorship regime, which reached its peak with an almost complete internet blackout during January 2026’s nationwide protests, relies heavily on a range of Chinese surveillance and control technologies. These include facial recognition systems initially used in China’s treatment of Uyghur minorities, as well as BeiDou, China’s global satellite navigation alternative to the US-based GPS.
Michael Caster, author of the Article 19 report, notes this collaboration as part of a broader, decades-long project between Iran and China, driven by shared principles of “cyber sovereignty” — the ideology that governments should exercise absolute control over the internet within their borders. “A really significant turning point was 2010, when both countries began implementing national internets,” Caster said, reflecting on the evolution of digital authoritarianism in both nations.
Key Chinese Companies Involved
Chinese telecommunications giants Huawei and ZTE are reported to have supplied Iran with Internet filtering and deep packet inspection (DPI) equipment, which allows authorities to monitor and control web traffic extensively. DPI technology, in particular, has been used by China to block politically sensitive content, such as information about Tiananmen Square and Tibetan issues, and is now repurposed to censor Iranian users.
In addition, Chinese security camera manufacturers Hikvision and Tiandy are implicated in providing surveillance technologies. Tiandy advertises itself as a top player in global surveillance and reportedly supplies Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and armed forces with facial recognition tools critical for mass surveillance.
Researchers also identified a less well-known set of Chinese providers offering “middlebox” devices capable of analyzing internet traffic at the network level. These contentious technologies raise concerns as their full capabilities remain opaque, complicating efforts to understand how the Iranian government surveils its citizens.
Impact of Internet Blackout on Human Rights
The January 2026 blackout enabled Iranian authorities to largely sever the country’s estimated 93 million people from the global internet during protests provoked by social and political grievances. This shutdown helped obscure widespread human rights abuses, including mass killings, with the full toll of protest-related deaths still unknown.
Today, Iran’s internet access remains restricted and uneven. The infrastructure underpinning these blackouts and censorship measures is the cumulative result of concerted development and international partnerships, notably with China.
Responses from Chinese Companies
Hikvision stated that it exited the Iranian market eight years ago and does not currently sell products there, emphasizing its commitment to compliance with global trade regulations. Similarly, ZTE confirmed it ceased operations in Iran in 2016. The report notes that other companies mentioned have also been contacted for comment but did not provide detailed responses.
Broader Implications
The use of Chinese censorship technologies is not limited to Iran. In recent years, reports have documented the export of similar tools to other countries, including Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Ethiopia. Amnesty International researcher Jurre van Bergen underscored the difficulties in fully assessing the capabilities of such equipment, which may vary from broad domain blocking to more granular interception of encrypted communications.
Conclusion
This new analysis sheds light on the transnational flow of digital authoritarianism tools, emphasizing how China’s technology exports contribute directly to repression and censorship abroad. It raises urgent questions about the global responsibility of technology providers and the need for increased transparency to safeguard internet freedoms and human rights worldwide.
For further details and continuous updates on this developing matter, follow coverage from The Guardian’s Middle East and Technology sections.
